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Abstract
The diusion of a novel taxing scheme among Dutch municipalities in the period 1998-2005
is studied. In this taxing scheme the waste disposal tax is made dependent on the amount of
waste a household produces. Inspecting the pattern of the introduction of this tari, it seems
to be contagious: the probability of introduction is increasing in the number of neighboring
municipalities that have already introduced this taxing scheme. A possible rationale is that
the tax encourages illegal dumping of waste which in turn might increase the waste of neigh-
boring municipalities (spillover eect). Using panel data it is possible to distinguish between
municipal specic eects and the spillover eect. The results indicate the presence of strong
spillovers.
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11 Introduction
Policy decisions of local governments are seldomly chosen in isolation. If a municipality taxes
the use of a public good and the externality of this public good extends beyond the municipal
borders, then the impact of this tax will also extend beyond the border. Hence, a decision to
change taxation by a single municipality can have far-reaching eects.
In this paper, the diusion of dierentiated waste disposal taxes in the Netherlands will
be examined. In the period 1998-2005 sixty-four Dutch municipalities have introduced waste
disposal charges that depend directly on the amount of waste a household produces. In total
112 of the 467 municipalities employ some form of DIFferentiated TARis (DIFTAR here-
after). This rapid diusion is remarkable. Prior to 1990 this kind of taxation was unheard
of. Moreover, one only has to examine a map to notice the strong clustering of DIFTAR-
municipalities (see Figure 1). The purpose of this paper is to examine the causes and the
strength of this apparent spillover eect.
| Insert Figure 1 here |
There could be a spillover eect for two reasons. First, (illegal) dumping of waste will
become more prevalent. And this dumping will in general not be conned to the municipality
that introduces DIFTAR. A study cited by Linderhof, Kooreman, Allers, and Wiersma (2001)
conrms this: in the Dutch municipality of Oostzaan 4{5% of total waste reduction resulted
from dumping in neighboring municipalities out of a total of 30% waste reduction. A second
spillover is an informational one. If a neighboring municipality introduces DIFTAR, then the
citizens of the municipality can better judge the impact of a DIFTAR-scheme and this may
facilitate the introduction of a DIFTAR scheme. I will show how these kinds of externalities
determine the introduction of DIFTAR.
The data that I will use to identify the presence of spillover eects, consists of a panel
with yearly observations for all Dutch municipalities for the period 1998{2005. For each
municipality it is known whether the municipality had DIFTAR in a certain year and what
the bordering municipalities are. The results of the local elections are also known as well as
a number of time-independent characteristics of the municipality. With cross-section data, it
might be problematic to identify a spillover eect since the introduction of DIFTAR could
2equally well be attributed to an unobserved regional eect. Therefore, in this paper, I use
spatial panel data to separate spillover eects from regional- and municipal specic eects.
The results indicate the existence of a strong positive spillover eect.
The paper is organized as follows. An overview of the literature is given in Section 2.
Section 3 presents a theoretical model. The institutional details and an overview of the data
are given in Section 4. In Section 5, I present the econometric model and discuss the estima-
tion results. Section 6 summarizes the results and discusses the welfare implications of the
contagious nature of introducing DIFTAR.
2 Overview of the literature
Most research on DIFTAR has focused on the question whether and to what extent DIFTAR
reduces the amount of waste produced by a household. Notable studies are Linderhof et al.
(2001) and Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996). The study by Linderhof et al. uses data for each
household in the municipality of Oostzaan before and after the introduction of a DIFTAR-
regime that taxes households for each kilogram of waste produced. This allows for estimation
of short- and long-run price eects, which they nd to be strong and negative. Fullerton
and Kinnaman use similar data for the city of Charlotteville, Virginia. The main dierence
is that the households are taxed per bag produced. In order to estimate weight reduction,
for a selection of households the bags were weighted. The eect of the tax was a signicant
reduction in the amount of waste. Besides the aforementioned studies, there are dozens of
studies that use aggregate data. Dijkgraaf (2004) is the most interesting of these studies from
our perspective since it uses Dutch data. In the Netherlands, municipalities use a variety
of DIFTAR-regimes: pricing per kilogram, pricing per bag, etcetera. Dijkgraaf nds that on
average each of the regimes lowers the total amount of waste collected but the scheme with
the most direct incentives (i.e. pricing per kilogram) reduces it by the largest amount.
The aim of this study is not to present further evidence that DIFTAR reduces the amount
of waste collected, but to show that the introduction of DIFTAR imposes externalities on
neighboring municipalities. Consequently, introducing DIFTAR raises strategic coordination
issues.
Before we continue our discussion, notice that dumping refers here to two activities. The
rst activity is the illegal dumping of waste on publicly owned land such as parks or forests.
3The second activity is either carrying waste to family/friends in neighboring municipalities
that do not charge households per kilogram of waste produced or dumping the waste at work.
The second activity is usually referred to as waste tourism. While this is legal, it is a form
tax evasion.1
Both Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) and Linderhof et al. (2001) present evidence that
DIFTAR increases the incidence of waste dumping. Fullerton and Kinnaman refer to the rst
activity and claim that it may account for 43% of the waste reduction. Linderhof et al. refer to
the second activity and suggest that 4{5% of waste is dumped in neighboring municipalities.
Moreover, Linderhof et al. explicitly mention that the illegal dumping of waste on publicly
owned land is a minor problem in the Netherlands. If DIFTAR implies the second kind
of activity, then a municipality without DIFTAR can diminish the eect of waste tourism
by introducing DIFTAR itself. This is an additional reason for a municipality to introduce
DIFTAR: by doing so, it will avoid the cost of waste tourism. This argument is elaborated
on in the theoretical model presented in Section 3.
There is a large literature, both theoretical and empirical, on policy diusion. The two large
strands in the theoretical literature are the Tiebout-hypothesis and yardstick competition.
As a short remark on terminology, I use both diusion and spillovers to denote any kind of
diusion whereas the Tiebout-hypothesis and yardstick competition denote two particular
forms of diusion which I will dene in the following paragraphs.
Tiebout (1956) argues that citizens vote with their feet and move toward municipalities
that oer the best combination of provision of local public goods and taxation. If local public
goods are indeed local then the outcome should be an ecient provision of public goods, which
is usually referred to as the Tiebout-hypothesis. This conclusion does not hold if local public
goods have an eect on neighboring municipalities (and the government cannot internalize
all externalities): then the outcome can be far from ecient.
Yardstick competition takes a dierent approach (Salmon, 1987). In this approach citizens
are unable to directly evaluate the performance of local politicians. Citizens can observe policy
outcomes, but they are unaware if a better outcome was available but not implemented.
Assuming that politicians in neighboring municipalities face the same trade-os, comparing
1There are other ways to reduce your output of waste. In Ireland, the introduction of DIFTAR has led
people to burn waste in their backyard. Unfortunately this seems to have caused an increase in the number of
burn victims (Murphy et al., 2007).
4outcomes with neighboring municipalities might provide an opportunity to indirectly evaluate
the performances of these local politicians. This leads politicians in neighboring municipalities
to make the same choices. This theory does not predict that the outcome will be ecient
or in which direction policy will move. In general, yardstick competition diers from the
Tiebout-hypothesis and the theory presented in this paper, because the externality is not
physical. Other non-physical externalities include learning models. The cost and benets
of introducing a new policy are uncertain. Consequently, the introduction of DIFTAR in a
neighboring municipalities is potentially a useful experiment to examine to associated cost
and benets. The successful introduction of DIFTAR may then spur the introduction in
neighboring municipalities.
A plethora of studies nds empirical evidence of both the Tiebout-hypothesis and yard-
stick competition. To name a few: Brown and Rork (2005) study lottery taxes among Ameri-
can states and nd evidence that supports the Tiebout-hypothesis. It appears that American
states lower their lottery tax in order to generate more revenue from state lotteries by attract-
ing out-of-state buyers. Case, Rosen, and Hines (1993) observe strong correlation between the
size of expenditures of American states and present this as evidence of scal interdependence.
In a related study, Besley and Case (1995) study the eect of income taxation on outcomes
in gubernatorial elections: lower taxes in neighboring states lead to a higher probability that
the incumbent loses the election. This is in line with the yardstick competition theory. Allers
and Elhorst (2005) study property taxes among Dutch municipalities and also nd evidence
in support of yardstick competition.
The above studies focus on tax rates and not on a tax innovation like DIFTAR. Following
Walker (1969), political scientists and economists alike have also devoted many studies to
the diusion of innovative tax instruments, see Ashworth, Geys, and Heyndels (2006) and
the references therein. For example, Ashworth et al. nd that the rapid diusion of a novel
environmental tax among Flemish municipalities during the 1990's could be partly determined
by the implementation of such a tax among neighboring municipalities. However, Ashworth
et al. do not explain why the probability of implementation is increasing in the number
of neighboring municipalities that have implemented the tax. Since the environmental tax
amounts to reserving part of the budgets for environmental purposes, this tax is a purely
symbolic act. Hence, there seems to be no reason for any spillover eect beyond imitation. In
5the case of DIFTAR studied in this paper, there is an externality present, which could explain
the spillover eect.
3 A theoretical model
In the model presented in this section, the diusion of DIFTAR is explained solely from
dumping in neighboring municipalities. In a guide for introducing DIFTAR (AOO, 2004),
aimed at municipalities, waste tourism is explicitly mentioned as an eect of introducing
DIFTAR. As discussed in Section 2, this is by no means the only possible rationale for the
diusion of DIFTAR. It is also not the only reason why a specic municipality might introduce
DIFTAR. Fairness concerns | polluters should pay | or environmental concerns could play
a role as well. However, I focus entirely on the waste-tourism motive and I want to illustrate
with a deliberately simple model how this externality works.
Suppose there are two neighboring municipalities: i = 1;2. Consumers in municipality i
have the following utility function:
U(D;C) = i
p
D + (1   i)C; (1)
where D is a (dirty) good that produces waste and C is a (clean) good that does not produce
waste. It is assumed that if a household consumes one unit of D, it also produces one unit
of waste. A fraction i of waste remains in the municipality of origin. The remaining fraction
(1   i) is dumped in the neighboring municipality. A municipality can only tax the waste
that is not dumped.
Assume that, for i;j = 1;2 with i 6= j and 0 <  < 1, we have:
i =
(
 if ti > 0 and tj = 0,
1 if ti = 0 or tj > 0,
(2)
where ti is the tax rate per unit of waste in municipality i. Waste of municipality i is dumped
in municipality j if and only if municipality i has introduced DIFTAR and municipality j has
not introduced DIFTAR. This is in line with the waste tourism explanation: consumers will
only dump their household waste at friends in neighboring municipalities if these friends can
dump extra waste without additional cost. I do not explicitly model the decision to dump
waste, it is assumed to occur at a rate independent of the cost of waste disposal. This is for the
sake of simplicity and is meant to capture the negative externality imposed on a municipality
6if its neighbor introduces DIFTAR. Note that the fraction of waste that is dumped depends
on the tax rate in both municipalities and, hence, i is a function of ti and tj.
If municipality 1 introduces a value tax per unit of waste and municipality 2 does not, then
consumers in municipality 1 will try to avoid taxation by dumping waste in municipality 2.
Since consumers in municipality 2 have no incentive to dump waste, the tax in municipality 1
will lead to an increase in waste for municipality 2. The cost of waste disposal in municipality
2 increases. In municipality 1 the cost goes down for two reasons. First, the price per unit of
waste increases and thus less waste is produced. Second, part of this waste is dumped in the
neighboring municipality 2, causing a further decrease in waste.
The (indirect) price of consuming one unit of D (assuming, to avoid cumbersome notation,
that all prices are normalized to one) is 1 + tii. The budget equation is:
(1 + tii)D + C = m   i; (3)
where m is income and i is a lump-sum tax to cover the cost of waste disposal. If ti = 0, then
the municipality will raise revenue through the lump-sum tax i per household. Otherwise
the municipality will raise revenue solely through the value tax ti > 0 and i will be zero.
Observe that i also depends on tj, since in case tj > 0 and ti = 0, waste from municipality
j is dumped in municipality i, which increases the lump-sum tax compared to the case in
which ti = tj = 0. Since utility is quasi-linear, consumption of D does not depend on m or i
as long as the cost of the optimal consumption of D does not exceed m   i. I will assume
that every household can aord this.
While it may seem strange that the amount of waste produced does not depend on income,
rst of all note that Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) in their empirical analysis nd a negative
relation between waste and income instead of the expected positive relation. This is dicult
to reconcile with a theoretical framework of waste producing goods and non-waste producing
goods. The theoretical model employed in Fullerton and Kinnaman (1993), that explicitly
considers the option to (rationally) recycle, predicts that low-income households with their
low opportunity cost recycle more. This would lead to a positive relation between waste
and income. But then, what kind of model would result in a negative relation between waste
production and income? I suggest that it should distinguish between two types of consumption
goods: besides the basic consumption good, a luxury alternative should be available. If the
basic consumption good is inferior and the luxury alternative produces less waste, then waste
7would decrease in income. These adjustment would not alter the results of the model presented
here since the focus is on waste reduction as a consequence of DIFTAR and not on distributive
considerations. So, I do not adjust the model to incorporate these elements.
Household waste production by a consumer in municipality i is:
Ai
4(1 + tii)2; where Ai =
2
i
(1   i)2. (4)
Total waste production in municipality i is:

i =
Ai
4(1 + tii)2Si; (5)
where Si is the total number of inhabitants in this municipality. Utility of the consumer in
the optimum is:
i
s
Ai
4(1 + tii)2 + (1   i)

m   i  
Ai
4(1 + tii)

: (6)
As a measure for consumer welfare I will derive the expression for consumers' surplus (CSi)
in case of quasilinear utility. Since I examine the change in consumer welfare, it makes sense to
examine equivalent variation which in the quasilinear case is equivalent to consumers' surplus.
The government takes into account the welfare of the consumers (i.e. CSi) when deciding to
introduce DIFTAR. Suppose a single consumer can only buy the non-waste producing good
C and receives a compensation CSi=Si in terms of good C such that his utility is the same as
in the optimum of (6). I compare the situation with a tax ti and i with a situation in which
all consumption is clean and there is no tax. Then CSi=Si is such that:
i
s
Ai
4(1 + tii)2 + (1   i)

m   i  
Ai
4(1 + tii)

= (1   i)[m + CSi=Si]: (7)
It follows that:
CSi =
i
1   i
s
Ai
4(1 + tii)2Si  

Ai
4(1 + tii)

Si   iSi (8)
=
Ai
4(1 + tii)
Si   iSi: (9)
Dijkgraaf and Gradus (2003) present evidence that the cost of waste disposal has constant
returns to scale. Therefore, I assume that the cost function is linear in the amount of waste:
c
i, where c > 0 is given. Assume that there are no further costs if a municipality decides to
change from ti = 0 to ti > 0 (i.e. implement DIFTAR).
8Suppose the local government tries to maximize consumers' surplus and to minimize the
amount of waste subject to a nancing constraint. This re
ects two considerations the local
government might take into account. It wants to be reelected and hence it must try to please
the electorate. On the other hand, the local government and the citizens might also have
environmental concerns. I use the amount of waste (both collected at the curb and dumped)
as a proxy for the state of the environment. And ultimately the local government needs
to cover the cost of waste collection. The government in municipality i faces the following
problem:
max
ti
CSi   i(i
i + (1   j)
j)
s.t. if ti > 0: c(i
i + (1   j)
j) = tii
i;
if ti = 0: c(
i + (1   j)
j) = iSi;
(10)
where i > 0 is a parameter that signies the strength of the environmental concerns. Exam-
ining the nancing constraint, we see that, since ti > 0 implies j = 1, the rst constraint
simplies to marginal cost pricing: ti = c. The other option is to set ti = 0 and raise the
money by taxing each household with a lump-sum tax i = c(
i + (1   j)
j)=Si.
The following game is played: the municipalities simultaneously and independently decide
to implement DIFTAR (i.e. set ti = c) or not. It can be shown that all four pure strategy
Nash equilibria are possible (for varying parameter values). Subsequently, I will characterize
the best-response for municipality i = 1;2 for varying parameter values in an attempt to
provide insight in when certain equilibria occur.
Suppose municipality j 6= i has chosen tj = 0. Then municipality i will introduce DIFTAR
if:
CSi(c)   i
i(c)  CSi(0)   i
i(0); (11)
where CSi() and 
i() are respectively consumers' surplus and total waste production as a
function of ti. After rearranging (11) the following expression is obtained
1
1 + c
 

(1 + c)2i  1   c   i: (12)
Inspecting (12), and using

(1+c)2 < 1, we see that if i is large enough, then municipality
i's best response is to introduce DIFTAR. One would expect green parties to have a high
aversion of waste, implying a high i and therefore be more likely to introduce DIFTAR even
if the neighboring municipality has not. If  is equal to zero, then (12) reduces to 1  1 c i.
9Consequently, if  is low enough, then it is also benecial to introduce DIFTAR. If  is low,
then both the cost of waste disposal and total waste production are reduced severely when
DIFTAR is implemented. A Nash equilibrium in which no municipality introduces DIFTAR
will not occur in the situation when  is low. Moreover, if c is high enough, then DIFTAR
will also be implemented. If the cost of waste disposal is high, then a reduction in waste
production will be more attractive.
Suppose municipality j has chosen tj = c. Then municipality i will introduce DIFTAR if:
CSi(c)   i
i(c)  CSi(0)   i(
i(0) + (1   )
j(c)): (13)
which after some manipulations yields:

(c + i)
Ai
4
  i
Ai
4(1 + c)2

+

(c + i)
(1   )Aj
4(1 + c)2 
Sj
Si



Ai
4
 
Ai
4(1 + c)

(14)
Note that everything between brackets are non-negative quantities. Hence, a municipality i
that either has a large enough i or a neighbor that is large enough relative to its own number
of inhabitants (i.e. Sj=Si large) introduces DIFTAR. So, having a large neighbor that chooses
to introduce DIFTAR can be the reason to introduce DIFTAR.
Now suppose that a social planner, e.g. a national government, determines the tax rates.
The social planner maximizes CS1 + CS2   s(
1 + 
2) subject to a nancing constraint.
The weight attached by the social planner to the amount of waste produced is s > 0 and is
not necessarily equal to 1 and/or 2. Observe that for the social planner the only reason for
introducing DIFTAR is a strong enough dislike of the amount of waste produced, i.e. a high
s. For the social planner, the dumping of waste is irrelevant to its decision.
The analysis above has shown three things:
1. The model can explain an isolated DIFTAR-municipality. An isolated DIFTAR-
municipalities probably has a high i and will introduce DIFTAR regardless of whether
neighboring municipalities have introduced DIFTAR. These neighboring municipalities
on the other hand have a low i and not enough neighboring municipalities that have
introduced DIFTAR.
2. The model can explain how DIFTAR spreads. A domino eect can occur: if a munici-
pality introduces DIFTAR, then the best response of a neighboring municipality could
10be to introduce DIFTAR as well. Generalizing, a mutual neighbor faced with two neigh-
boring DIFTAR municipalities and consequently even more waste dumping might now
implement DIFTAR.
3. The Nash equilibrium is not necessarily socially optimal. As the previous point shows, a
municipality might be coerced to introduce DIFTAR through waste dumping. The social
planner internalizes these externalities and could choose to not introduce DIFTAR in
the neighboring municipality.
Concluding, the essence of this model can be captured by a panel data model in which we
have municipal specic eects (indicating the tendency to introduce DIFTAR) and a variable,
like the percentage of neighboring municipalities that have introduced DIFTAR (representing
the threshold of Si=Sj in (14)). Using the percentage of neighboring DIFTAR-municipalities
as an explanatory variable yields a standard model in the spatial econometrics literature (cf.
Anselin, 1988). I will also consider a variant, closer to the theoretical model, in which the
explanatory variable is the total number of inhabitants of neighboring municipalities that
have introduced DIFTAR divided by the number of inhabitants of the municipality itself.
4 Description of institutional details and the data
4.1 Institutional details
The Netherlands is, as of January 1, 2005, divided in 467 municipalities. The average munic-
ipality has an area of slightly less than 90 square kilometer, or less than 10  10 kilometer.
The number of inhabitants ranges from a thousand to 750 thousand. A municipality usually
consists of one larger city or a collection of villages. Despite these large dierences, they have
broadly the same obligations and means of taxation. They are required to execute several
tasks, but have considerable autonomy regarding the details.
Local politics decides on these details. The political system in municipalities is based on
proportional representation. Apart from a handful of municipalities, no single party has the
majority. As in national politics, it is common to form a coalition with a majority backing. In
fact, these coalitions tend to be larger than strictly necessary. The coalition parties provide
aldermen. I will use the political alignment of the aldermen as the main political indicators.
Two types of indicators will be constructed: percentage of alderman that are aligned with a
11certain political direction and a measure of concentration of the coalition with respect to the
political alignment. It is posited that heavily fractured coalitions are less eective in causing
major changes.
One of the things a municipality is required to do is to collect and dispose household
waste. It raises revenue by taxing households to pay for the associated cost. The municipality
is free to hire a company to take care of the collection and disposal of waste, but it can also
choose to organize the collection of waste itself. In practice, small municipalities outsource
completely and larger municipalities usually outsource only the disposal of waste. Waste that
is not recycled is mostly incinerated.
No matter how waste is collected, it is the municipality that determines the manner and
the height of the taxes. Until the early 1990s, practically all municipalities taxed consumers
according to a 
at fee (although possibly dependent on the size of the household). During
the last decade many municipalities have made the tax dependent on the amount of waste a
household produces. The main types of DIFTAR-schemes are:
Weight-based: In this scheme collected waste is weighted and households are charged per
kilogram.
Volume-based: In this scheme households are equipped with a container of a certain size and
they have to pay each time the container is presented at the curbside and emptied.
Expensive bag: Here waste is only collected if it is presented in a particular bag. A household
buys these bags in advance in a nearby shop. The main advantage of this scheme are
the low cost of implementation and the small administrative cost.
All these schemes lower the amount of waste (in kilograms), but the eect is most pronounced
for the weight-based scheme (Dijkgraaf, 2004; Fullerton & Kinnaman, 1996).
I want to conclude this section with two remarks on some other aspects of DIFTAR: the
politics of DIFTAR and the problem of dumping. Empirical evidence suggests that at the
individual level the relation between income and waste production, if anything, is decreasing
(Fullerton & Kinnaman, 1996). Then the introduction of DIFTAR is actually the introduction
of a regressive tax where the poor may end up paying more than the rich. Of course, this eect
is weakened by the incentive to produce less waste, but this could well explain why left-wing
12parties with a strong voter base among the lower classes (e.g. in the Netherlands this applies
to the Socialist Party) are vehemently against the introduction of DIFTAR schemes.
Both Linderhof et al. (2001) and Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996) nd evidence that a
substantial part of the reduction in waste is due to dumping. Fullerton and Kinnaman (1996)
even hypothesize that in a large, anonymous city like New York, a DIFTAR scheme would
lead to near-100% dumping of waste. It is certainly clear that the introduction of a DIFTAR
scheme can only be successful if laws against waste dumping are enforced. This may well be
the reason that larger cities are reluctant to introduce DIFTAR. Even in cities like Groningen
(in the northern part of the Netherlands) where the necessary infrastructure is present in much
of the city (i.e. underground collection bins that record how much each household dumps)
DIFTAR has not been introduced (as of 2007).2
4.2 The data
I have yearly data for the period 1998-2005 for all Dutch municipalities. A slightly complicat-
ing factor is the merging of municipalities.3 In 1998 there are 553 municipalities of which 467
are left at the end of the sample. All data is for municipalities as they existed in 2005.4 Note
that the ve Wadden-islands o the northern coast (Texel, Vlieland, Terschelling, Ameland
and Schiermonnikoog, each of which is a separate municipality) do not share a border with
any other municipality. There are 467  8 = 3736 observations.
I introduce the following variables:
Yit: Value 1 if municipality i or a part of municipality i has DIFTAR in year t, and zero
otherwise.
Wij: Value 1=(total number of neighbors of municipality i) if municipality i and municipal-
ity j share a border, and zero otherwise. Note that Wii = 0 and that for all municipalities
except the Wadden-islands,
P
j Wij = 1. For the Wadden-islands, Wij = 0 for all j. The
(467467) matrix W  fWijg467
i;j=1 is symmetric in the following sense: if Wij > 0, then
Wji > 0. Figure 2 illustrates how the border matrix W is constructed.
2Dumping in some areas already occurs even though there are no monetary cost of throwing a bag in the
bin.
3There used to be more than 1000 municipalities in the Netherlands, some having less than 500 inhabitants.
In recent decades the Dutch government has striven to increase the size of municipalities.
4There is a great deal of policy synchronizing in the years leading up to a merger. Therefore treating
municipalities, that are to merge, as if they have already merged seems to be the natural choice.
13PROVi: The province in which municipality i is located (Groningen = 1, Friesland = 2,
Drenthe = 3, Overijssel = 4, Gelderland = 5, Utrecht = 6, North-Holland = 7, South-
Holland = 8, Zeeland = 9, North-Brabant = 10, Limburg = 11 and Flevoland = 12).5
RURALi: The rurality of the municipality (None = 1, ...,Very = 5).
| Insert Figure 2 here |
I further have data on several other characteristics of municipalities such as the number
of inhabitants, the income distribution, the average household size and the percentage single-
member households. Finally, the results for all local elections are known. I focus on the number
of aldermen each party has in each municipality. This data is summarized in the following
variables:
LEFTit: The percentage of aldermen representing a left-wing party (i.e. PvdA, GroenLinks,
SP and local left-wing parties).6
LOCALit: The percentage of aldermen representing a local party (as opposed to a national
party) including local left-wing and local christian parties. Local parties do not partic-
ipate in national elections.
CONFESit: The percentage of aldermen representing a christian party (i.e. CDA, SGP,
ChristenUnie and local christian parties).7
HIit: The Herndahl-index of the coalition, i.e. the sum over the parties of the squared
percentage of aldermen representing a party.
Remark that these are our only time-varying variables besides the DIFTAR-variable itself.
4.3 Descriptive statistics
Tables 1 and 2 show the number of DIFTAR-municipalities for the dierent categories of
PROVi and RURALi. Almost all DIFTAR-municipalities are rural (RURALi = 4 or 5) and
5The Netherlands has three layers of government, which are, from bottom to top, municipalities, provinces
and the national government. The provinces happen to roughly coincide with a sense of regional identity and
culture.
6The PvdA is the social democratic party comparable to the British Labour Party, GroenLinks (literally
GreenLeft) is a left-wing environmental party, SP is a socialist party.
7CDA is the mainstream christian-democratic party, both SGP and ChristenUnie represent orthodox protes-
tants.
14most of them are in North-Brabant or Limburg. Presence is notably increasing in Gelderland
and Overijssel, as well as in smaller cities (i.e. RURALi = 2 or 3). In accordance with
these facts, we see from Tables 3 and 4 that the typical DIFTAR-municipality tends to have
few inhabitants, be (relatively) sparsely populated, have relatively high incomes, with large
households. Politically, the local and christian parties are overrepresented.8
| Insert Table 1 here |
| Insert Table 2 here |
| Insert Table 3 here |
| Insert Table 4 here |
Table 5 shows the results of a simple regression of Yi;2005 (municipalities that have DIFTAR
in 2005) on dummies for province (PROVi) and rurality (RURALi). It appears that there is
a strong positive eect of being in North-Brabant or Limburg. Also if RURALi = 2 or 3, then
municipalities are less likely to introduce DIFTAR then if RURALi = 5. There is no eect if
RURALi = 1 (i.e. the municipality is one of the twelve biggest cities) or if RURALi = 4.
| Insert Table 5 here |
Table 6 shows the results of regressing Yi;2005 on LEFTi;2005, HIi;2005, LOCALi;2005 and
CONFESi;2005. We see that HI, LOCAL and CONFES have a signicant positive eect.
The positive eect of both LOCAL and CONFES is due to the prevalence of DIFTAR
in North-Brabant and Limburg: in both provinces these types of parties get a larger share
of the vote than these parties have nationally. The regression also indicates that a highly
concentrated coalition is more successful in introducing DIFTAR.
| Insert Table 6 here |
8In North-Brabant and especially Limburg, the two provinces where most DIFTAR municipalities are
situated, in local elections mainly local parties participate.
15Table 7 shows the average number of neighboring DIFTAR-municipalities for both
DIFTAR- and non-DIFTAR-municipalities. Observe that, on average, DIFTAR-municipalities
have more neighboring DIFTAR-municipalities than non-DIFTAR-municipalities. Naturally,
since many municipalities have introduced DIFTAR in the last decade, the gure is rising
for both types, but it has risen faster for DIFTAR-municipalities: the average for DIFTAR-
municipalities has increased by 1:04, whereas this number has only increased by 0:34 for
non-DIFTAR-municipalities.
| Insert Table 7 here |
5 Econometric model and estimation results
The basic idea behind the econometric model is the following. The probability that a mu-
nicipality i implements DIFTAR in year t is explained by the proportion of neighboring
municipalities that have already introduced DIFTAR,
PN
j=1 WijYj;t 1, a set of other explana-
tory variables (a row vector Xit), a (spatial) xed eect i for each municipality and a time
xed eect t. This is broadly in line with the theory presented in Section 3. Note that
PN
j=1 WijYj;t 1 can be interpreted as a weighted average. Moreover, the other explanatory
variables have to vary over time. So, they consist of the political variables LEFTit, LOCALit,
CONFESit and HIit. I want to estimate a model of the following form:
P[Yit = 1] = F(i + t + 
N X
j=1
WijYj;t 1 + Xit); (15)
where F() is a cumulative distribution function,  a parameter indicating the strength of
the spillover eect and  a column vector of other parameters. The proportion of neighbor-
ing municipalities that have already introduced DIFTAR (
PN
j=1 WijYj;t 1) is treated as an
exogenous variable. First, consider the following linear probability model, where F(x) = x:
Yit = i + t + 
N X
j=1
WijYjt + Xit + it; (16)
where it is an error term. If the error term is i.i.d., then this equation can be estimated using
a standard xed eects estimator. The results are shown in the rst three columns of Table
8 for resp. no time xed eects and no extra regressors, no time xed eect but with extra
16regressors and with time xed eects and with extra regressors. In all three regressions,  is
positive, signicant and approx. equal to 0.3. Observe that if all neighboring municipalities of
municipality i have introduced DIFTAR, then  indicates by how much the probability, that
municipality i introduces DIFTAR, will increase. According to these estimates this probability
will increase by about 30%, which is substantial. The eect of the other regressors seems to
be minimal: there is a small positive eect if more aldermen belong to christian parties and
no time xed eect is included and, surprisingly, a small negative eect if local parties are
more strongly represented in the coalition and a time xed eect is included.9
The literature on spatial econometrics argues that the assumption of i.i.d. error terms in
spatial models will lead to biased estimates (cf. Anselin, 1988, and Elhorst, 2003). Specically,
it is easy to imagine that if municipalities are part of the same province, then a change in
provincial policy (e.g., a temporary subsidy to introduce DIFTAR) could make each munic-
ipality in this province more likely to introduce DIFTAR. If we do not observe this subsidy,
then the error terms of municipalities in this province will be correlated. To account for this,
suppose that:
it = 

N X
j=1
Vijjt + uit; (17)
where uit is an iid error term with variance 2, 
 a parameter signifying the spatial au-
tocorrelation coecient and V is a matrix such that Vij > 0 if i and j share a common
characteristic, e.g. if they are located in the same province.10 This allows me to take into
account common shocks that are not picked up by the other time-varying variables. I will
consider three specications of V :
Contiguity: In this specication, V is equal to W: Vij > 0 if and only if municipalities i and
j share a border
Same province: Vij > 0 if and only if municipalities i and j are in the same province.
Same rurality: Vij > 0 if and only if municipalities i and j are of the same rurality. This
specication couples big cities to big cities and small rural municipalities to other small
rural municipalities.
9In the simple regressions shown in Table 6, local parties seemed to have a positive eect on the introduction
of DIFTAR.
10Furthermore, like W, the row sums of V are normalized to one. The diagonal of V consists of zeros. The
matrix V is in general not symmetric in the usual sense, but if Vij > 0, then Vji > 0.
17Identication of this model is essentially achieved by restricting interactions. The exoge-
nous variables relating to municipality i are assumed to only have a direct eect on Yit. So,
e.g., a left-wing coalition in municipality i will only in
uence the probability of introducing
DIFTAR in municipality i. Furthermore, the matrix V is assumed to be known.11 Elhorst
(2003) shows that with these restrictions the parameters of interest (, 
 and ) can be
estimated using a maximum likelihood estimator.12
The estimation results are shown in Table 8. First, the estimates of  are still positive
and signicant, but they are somewhat smaller and in the 20{25% range. Second, the eect
of the political variables is still small. In short, a coalition with few aldermen representing
local parties but with a lot of aldermen representing christian parties will be more likely
to introduce DIFTAR. The estimates of the spatial autocorrelation coecient 
 is positive
and signicant for all three specication of V . However, the estimates of 
 are substantially
lower if the contiguity specication is used instead of the province- or rurality specication.
This seems to suggest that most of the actual impact of neighboring municipalities is already
picked up by the variable
PN
j=1 WijYj;t 1. Finally, note that the province specication seems
to yield a slightly better t than the rurality specication.
Returning to (15), instead of choosing F() to be linear, another possibility is to choose
the logit distribution or the standard normal distribution (probit). The advantage is that the
discreteness of the dependent variable is accounted for. However, if we want to incorporate
some form of spatial interdependence, then the estimation is decidedly less straightforward.
Therefore, I only perform a rudimentary logit and probit estimation to conrm that the
positive estimates of  do not vanish if a proper discrete choice model is used. The estimation
results are shown in the last two columns of Table 8. Again, the estimates of  are positive and
signicant. But, unlike the previous estimations, none of the political variables are signicant.
| Insert Table 8 here |
The use of the proportion of municipalities that have introduced DIFTAR as the main
11See Mot (2001) for a general discussion of identication in models of social and spatial interactions.
12An implementation of this maximum likelihood estimator is included in LeSage's Econometrics Tool-
box for Matlab (http://www.spatial-econometrics.com/) as the sem_panel-routine. An updated version of
this routine is available from Paul Elhorst's website (http://www.rug.nl/economics/faculty/medewerkers/
elhorstjp/software). All computations in this paper have been executed with Matlab R2007a and the Econo-
metrics Toolbox.
18explanatory variable is not entirely in line with the theoretical considerations of Section 3
where we argued that the relative size of these municipalities mattered. The reason for using
it nonetheless is that if the proportion of municipalities matters more than the relative size,
then this might be an indication that there is an informational spillover instead of a spillover
as a consequence of waste dumping. Indeed Allers and Elhorst (2005) use contiguity to nd
evidence of an informational spillover in Dutch municipal property taxes (i.e. they use the
unweighted average of the property tax rate of neighbors as their explanatory variable). For the
next set of regressions the variable
PN
j=1 WijYj;t 1 is going to be replaced by
PN
j=1 UijYj;t 1,
where Uij is the number of inhabitants in municipality j divided by the total number of
inhabitants in all neighboring municipalities of i if municipality i and j are neighbors and
zero otherwise.13 The results are shown in Table 9. Comparing Table 9 to Table 8, we see that
they are broadly the same. The dierences are mainly that the estimates of  are lower (but
still positive and signicant) and in the logit- and probit-specications the Herndahl-index of
the coalition is now signicant but negative. This would imply that a more shattered coalition
is more likely to implement DIFTAR: the opposite of what was posited in Section 4 and the
simple regression in Table 6 showed. Comparing the t of the estimations in Table 9, where
the relative size of the municipalities matters, to the estimations in Table 8 where it does not,
we see that the t does not improve although according to the theory of Section 3 it should.
This casts some doubt on the hypothesis that the spillover is caused by waste tourism and
points at the direction of an informational spillover. But this evidence is far from conclusive.
| Insert Table 9 here |
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper, a theoretical model was developed to explain how waste dumping can lead to
the diusion of DIFTAR-taxes. An econometric model, inspired by theoretical arguments,
was subsequently used to test whether this diusion takes place. The diusion parameter 
is positive and signicant and the result is robust to a variety of estimation procedures. This
gives us solid evidence that a taxation scheme which imposes externalities on neighboring
13This specication of U still has row sums to equal one and the variable
PN
j=1 UijYj;t 1 is therefore a
weighted average but now larger neighboring municipality have a bigger impact.
19communities might be the cause for a similar kind of taxation scheme to be implemented in
these neighboring communities. This particular conclusion is in line with the theory developed
in Section 3.
The theory is further supported by the accuracy of the prediction that DIFTAR-
municipalities tend to stay DIFTAR: in the data there are no instances of municipalities
abandoning DIFTAR. Our nal prediction | municipalities that introduce DIFTAR rst are
likely to have a high aversion of waste production | cannot be tested by the methods used
in this paper, although anecdotal evidence suggests that pioneering municipalities do have
a unique legislative composition. For instance, in the municipality of Oostzaan, GroenLinks
was the largest party when DIFTAR was introduced, but nationally GroenLinks is one of
the smaller parties. The nding that the percentage of neighboring municipalities that have
introduced DIFTAR oers a better explanation than the relative size of these municipalities
is denitely not in line with the theory as developed in Section 3 and points in the direction
of an informational spillover. Further research in this eld should try to answer this question.
From the viewpoint of the national government, the diusion process may or may not
be benecial. This depends on whether the central government would choose to implement
DIFTAR for all municipalities. If the national government is in favor of DIFTAR, then the con-
tagious nature of DIFTAR can help to enforce this while municipalities are still autonomous.
Of course, if the national government opposes DIFTAR, then the conclusion reverses. The
national government should in that case restrict the freedom of municipalities especially in
areas where non-local externalities are important or facilitate coordination.
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21Table 1: The spread of DIFTAR conditional on the province in which the municipality is
located
Province
1998
Gr Fr Dr Ov Gl Ut NH ZH Ze NB Li Fl
all 25 31 12 25 56 32 65 87 13 68 47 6
DIFTAR 2 0 2 2 9 0 2 4 0 10 17 0
no DIFTAR 23 31 10 23 47 32 63 83 13 58 30 6
perc. DIFTAR 0.08 0.00 0.17 0.08 0.16 0.00 0.03 0.05 0.00 0.15 0.36 0.00
2005
Gr Fr Dr Ov Gl Ut NH ZH Ze NB Li Fl
all 25 31 12 25 56 32 65 87 13 68 47 6
DIFTAR 5 3 2 10 22 0 3 3 0 33 30 1
no DIFTAR 20 28 10 15 34 32 62 84 13 35 17 5
perc. DIFTAR 0.20 0.10 0.17 0.40 0.39 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.49 0.64 0.17
Note: Gr = Groningen, Fr = Friesland, Dr = Drenthe, Ov = Overijssel, Gl = Gelderland, Ut =
Utrecht, NH = North-Holland, ZH = South-Holland, Ze = Zeeland, NB = North-Brabant, Li =
Limburg, Fl = Flevoland.
Table 2: The spread of DIFTAR conditional on the rurality of the municipality
Rurality
1998
None Very
1 2 3 4 5
all 12 56 93 160 146
DIFTAR 0 1 6 22 19
no DIFTAR 12 55 87 138 127
perc. DIFTAR 0:00 0:02 0:06 0:14 0:13
2005
None Very
1 2 3 4 5
all 12 56 93 160 146
DIFTAR 0 3 12 56 41
no DIFTAR 12 53 81 104 105
perc. DIFTAR 0:00 0:05 0:13 0:35 0:28
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23Figure 2: Example of a border matrix
Map
1 2
3
4
5
Matrix W
2
6 6
6 6
4
0 1
2
1
2 0 0
1
2 0 1
2 0 0
1
3
1
3 0 1
3 0
0 0 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
3
7 7
7 7
5
Table 3: Characteristics of DIFTAR municipalities vs. non-DIFTAR municipalities
Average
1998
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
all 34.90 901.00 34.90 42.40 22.70 26.90 2.47
DIFTAR 23.50 654.00 33.40 43.40 23.10 24.30 2.52
no DIFTAR 36.20 929.00 35.10 42.30 22.60 27.20 2.47
2005
all 34.89 900.73 34.90 42.41 22.69 26.90 2.47
DIFTAR 24.99 643.82 33.78 43.88 22.33 23.82 2.56
no DIFTAR 38.01 981.79 35.25 41.94 22.81 27.87 2.45
Note: Column (1) contains the number of inhabitants divided by 1000, column (2) the average number
of addresses per square kilometer (a measure of population density), column (3) the percentage of
households in a municipality that are in the lowest 40 per cent income group nationally, column (4)
the percentage of households that are neither in the lowest 40 per cent income group nationally nor in
the highest 20 per cent income group, column (5) the percentage of households that are in the highest
20 per cent income group nationally, column (6) the percentage of one-person households and column
(7) the average number of persons in a household.
24Table 4: Result of local elections in DIFTAR municipalities vs. non-DIFTAR municipalities
Mean percentage of aldermen
after the rst election in the period 1998{2002
LEFT LOCAL CONFES
all 0:27 0:23 0:50
DIFTAR 0:22 0:35 0:66
no DIFTAR 0:28 0:20 0:45
Note: In most municipalities the rst municipal election is in 1998, but due to the frequent merging
of municipalities in the 1990s some municipalities did not have an election until 2000.
Table 5: DIFTAR regressed on dummies for province and rurality
Ordinary Least-squares Estimates
Dependent Variable: Y05
Variable Coecient t-statistic t-probability
constant 0.1901 1.2 0.22
PROV=1 0.0148 0.1 0.93
PROV=2 -0.0828 -0.5 0.62
PROV=3 0.0024 0.0 0.99
PROV=4 0.2404 1.4 0.15
PROV=5 0.2220 1.4 0.16
PROV=6 -0.1427 -0.9 0.38
PROV=7 -0.0876 -0.6 0.58
PROV=8 -0.0923 -0.6 0.55
PROV=9 -0.1628 -0.9 0.37
PROV=10 0.3153 2.0 0.04
PROV=11 0.4638 2.9 0.00
RURAL=1 -0.1033 -0.9 0.36
RURAL=2 -0.1479 -2.4 0.01
RURAL=3 -0.1255 -2.5 0.01
RURAL=4 0.0332 0.7 0.46
R2 0.30
Adj. R2 0.27
2 0.1328
Durbin-Watson 2.0836
Nobs 467
Nvars 16
Note: Bold indicates signicant at a ve percent level. The reference level is a rural municipality in
the province of Flevoland.
25Table 6: Regression on the political variables
Ordinary Least-squares Estimates
Dependent Variable: Y05
Variable Coecient t-statistic t-probability
constant -0.1525 -1.5394 0.1244
LEFT05 0.2128 1.8241 0.0688
HI05 0.3855 3.8776 0.0001
LOCAL05 0.3597 2.2374 0.0257
CONFES05 0.2668 2.3970 0.0169
R2 0.06
Adj. R2 0.05
2 0.1729
Durbin-Watson 2.0391
Nobs 467
Nvars 5
Note: Bold indicates signicant at a ve percent level.
Table 7: Average number of neighboring municipalities with DIFTAR
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
all 0.48 0.73 0.84 0.94 0.97 0.98 1.06 1.14
DIFTAR 1.42 2.11 2.25 2.29 2.39 2.34 2.43 2.46
no DIFTAR 0.38 0.47 0.54 0.60 0.60 0.61 0.67 0.72
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